Factors of Late Marriage:

A Survival Analysis of Life Courses for Marriage in Japan

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Abstract

Recent studies on the declining fertility rate of Japanese women have revealed that a considerable part of this can be explained by deferral of marital timing, as well as a declining fertility rate among married couples. In this paper, a possibility is demonstrated that late marriage is in part due to the adversity that the Japanese young must face after their educational career. In fact, the payback of education is not significantly good enough even for the highly educated, as a result of the seniority wage system in Japan. Additional evidence shows that those with no experience at living apart from their parents, that is with possible family support, tend to be able to marry earlier. This suggests that those without family support have more difficulties to marry.

1 Recent Trends in the Research Field

Even though the analysis presented in this paper is primarily dedicated to the life courses of young adults in Japan before marriage, it is closely linked to the more familiar and important issue; fertility. The most familiar problems regarding the family issue in recent Japan is no doubt the problem of declining fertility rate. The orthodox query regarding this is as follows. "The driving force causing a decline in the fertility rate is either late marriage or the low birth rate among married couples. Which of the two is the stronger factor?"

Although most earlier researchers in Japan seemed to have unanimously claimed that the influence of late marriage has a much higher contribution rate than the low fertility rate in families, recent demographic research shows that the effect of the low birth rate among married couples might have a great influence, as well (Iwasawa 2002, Hiroshima 2000). This change in the trend in demographic fields took place in part due to the transition of the actual state. Some demographers suggest that the earlier decline in the birth rate can be properly attributed to delayed marriage, while the recent sharp decline in the fertility rate can only be explained by taking the low fertility rate among married couples into account. Another reason for this theoretical shift in trend is brought about by the sophistication of the data analysis method. However I will not explore this possibility in this paper.

This way of looking into the socially consequential problems related to fertility, that is attributing it to either of the two factors, has great meaning in terms of effective action against the falling birthrate. Basically, if the declining birth rate could be "purely" attributed to the late marriage entry (thus deferral of the timing of having kids), we have nothing to worry about. In this case couples will sooner

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or later have two kids just like couples in former generations did. The falling birthrate would then catch up, even though it shows temporal decline initially (Hiroshima 2000).

The fact that the fertility behavior among married couples also has great importance indicates that the fertility problem is a "real" and imminent one. In retrospect, by setting the problem as "late marriage or couple behavior change," we might have been blurring the seriousness of the problem of declining fertility rate. The form of query has changed. Researchers have been exploring the issue of whether or not the declining fertility rate is the true problem or a spurious one brought about by the temporal tendency to wed and bear later. Now, they are in charge of investigating the possible causes of both late marriage and procreation slowdown by married couples. The problem has been found to be not spurious, but the causes of it has not been thoroughly discussed.

Before entering the detailed analysis using micro data, we can crudely imagine the facts that could be related to the problem by shifting our focus to the other developed countries suffering from a declining birth rate. Countries with serious fertility troubles are Germany, Italy, Spain, Taipei, Korea, and of course Japan[1]. These countries share similar traits. They had a late departure for industrialization and modernization compared to England and France where people now face less serious problems with fertility.

In England and France, the first stage of the so-called demographic transition began as early as the 18th or 19th century. The rise in the total living level, rapid improvement in public health, and a better nutrient state, all of which are the results of industrialization, caused a high fertility rate and a low death rate at the same time. This period was sooner or later edged out by the second stage, where fertility started to decline. Initially, researchers were likely to assume that the demographic transition leads to a balanced state. But in effect, many countries have had to prepare for serious population decline. This phase of population change is sometimes called the second demographic transition.

What is more important for a nation like Japan is the hypothesis that the German demographer G. Mackenroth called "a law of a situation progress acceleration". This means there is a tendency that the later the transition begins, the shorter the period for this transitions is. In short, later developed countries have experienced a fast transition toward a low fertility society.

The second demographic transition is caused mainly by the rising cost of child care. Highly developed industrial societies require high quality human resources, which are attained by high and costly education. As a result, couples started to have less kids and concentrated their scarce resources on them.

So far this is the classic theory of demographic transition, but it cannot successfully explain the differences in fertility levels in developed countries. As already stated, the countries with extremely low fertility rates have experienced the rapid transition. This has its own consequences. One of them is the gender aspect. In the late starter countries, people tend to have more or less traditional attitudes and various institutions have strong sexist practices. Harbinger countries like France have spent a lot

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1 ） Reliable data is available in Bando (2002). According to this, TFR of these countries are; 1.36 (Germany, 1997), 1.19 (Italy, 1995), 1.19 (Spain, 1997), 1.48 (South Korea, 1999). Other than those, most of former Soviet Union countries and countries in Eastern Europe have low TFRs.

of time developing a system where women experience less irrational adversities when they work and have kids at the same time. Less sexist nations are also advantageous for marriage, for in countries with clear divisions of labor at home, it might be a setback for women to go into marriage, where women have to work "twice"; at their office and back home.

The sharp division of labor might cause even more serious frustrations for women's marriages especially in countries like Japan and Italy, where it does not felt so strange to stay at a parents' house even after finishing last phase in one's ducational career. Especially for women, it might be much better to stay single and live with their parents. The famous phrase "parasite singles", coined by Japanese sociologist M. Yamada, appropriately expresses this option for late marriage or less marriage for the Japanese young people. Parasite singles are those who stay single and live at their parents' house. Some advocates of the parasite single theory highlight the point that one of the reasons why Japanese young women tend to stay at the parasite single level is the sexist attitude taken by Japanese men.

The other aspect of parasite single is that in Japan, unlike in the U.S., the income of younger people is usually much less than the older. This means that making a transfer from a wonderful life with rich dad and no room charge and of course full-service by mom to a life with a cheap (male) spouse with high rent, self service and service for their (male) spouse who won't do chores is much more difficult, especially for female singles.

These arguments are not yet fully investigated. Therefore, I am going to present a few models on life courses of the Japanese young till their first marriage, and validate them with survey data. First in the next section, I will show models that link marriage timing and its factors.

2   Models of Life Courses untill the First Marriage

In this section, models to be validated are introduced, then the data sets used to substantiate them are presented in the next section.

All theoretical models provided in this paper utilize limited factors which are; the gender of subjects, their educational backgrounds, their economic states, the family support, and the social capital. All of them have been designed to explain marriage deferral. The other issue, low fertility rate in married couples, will not be investigated in this paper, due to limited space.

The simplest possible model using those factors is this: a higher education career eventuates in a better economic state, that leads to earlier marriage. Another powerful hypothesis derived by this model linking education and income is that higher education means higher opportunity cost, possibly caused by married life. The latter case usually presupposes gender differences, where marriage might be costlier for working women in strong sexist states like Japan as quitting after getting married or child birth is still common.

The second important model to be checked is the parasite single model. It has not yet been fully

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2 ）Looking just at the economic support, being with parents is great profit for the young. Parasite single women spend less than 70% of their income for living expense. See Mifune and Shigekawa (1999).

investigated whether parasite singles profit from being supported by their parents[2]. Some, including Yamada, argue that parasite singles benefit from parents' support, enjoying their life as a consumer, not in their bachelor pad but at their parents' house. However, leading this rich life with ample family support, they suppose, poses an impediment to living an independent life for the young. On the other hand, at least theoretically, living a parasitic life might mean that a parasite single can receive ample family support enabling them to save their income for her or his future life, including marriage. If this is the case, choice for a parasite single does not necessarily lead to late marriage.

A third point which deserves an inquiry is the effect of gender. As the classic works like that of Brinton show, working opportunity has been institutionally, thus strictly, stratified by gender in Japan (Brinton, 1988). Surrounded by that kind of institutional environment, choices for women, like opting for junior colleges rather than 4-year colleges, quitting jobs at marriage or the birth of a child, are "rational", because if a woman has little hope for advancement in her job status, it is nothing but a waste to invest in human capital or continue working with a low return sacrificing their chance to "marry up" to a prospective man, and to have a child[3].

In terms of the issue proposed here, namely the factor of late marriage, the relationship between the gender factor and late marriage can be described as below. Given the sexist working opportunities in Japan, men might want women with less human capital as their wives. This is because, if a woman is less educated, her cost to quit her job at marriage or childbirth is less, which may be good for a man so he can concentrate on his work, leaving the housework to his wife. If this is the case, a rational choice for a man is to marry "down", thus it is possible that men who have married down married earlier. Vice versa for women. This perspective implies that marriage benefits from the specialization of gender roles (Becker, 1981=1991). A rival hypothesis to this model is this: it is rational for both men and women to marry "up", because partners with higher social and economics status could bring him or her more resources.

If the specialization is the source of merit for marriage, equalizing of the job opportunity drives especially women to defer marrying if they are highly educated. Men could find partners early especially if they have a good background in education. If the "greater resource" model is right, which assumes that it is the sum of resources partners can bring to their relationship that counts and enhances marriage, it could be assumed that people with more money marry earlier. The factor of gender, however, is not substantiated in this paper, for the focus is on other factors and there will be no space for arguing about the factor of gender at full length.

The last factor affecting marriage timing is somewhat difficult to be substantiated, but still can have a strong effect. This is the "social capital[4]". This factor does not so much accelerate or deter

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3) The phrase "marry up" here refers to the situation where women marry men with higher social and economical status, not the personal attractiveness. Social and economical merit and personal attraction can work different roles between men and women. Traits like one's appearance might bring greater chance for women to find a better mate.

4) There are several meanings of social capital, reflecting the various research fields. Most sociologists think of it as the investment to social relations with expected returns (Lin 2001). Economists like Becker take it as the socially valid norm, which could affect the utility function of the individual (Becker and Murphy 2000). Social capital in this paper is close to the latter meaning.

marriage, as stabilize its choice and timing. Certainly, the selection of marriage timing is relatively stable among people everywhere. In Japan, the age for males at initial marriage has changed from 28.2 in 1987 to 28.5 in 2002. It can be said that the male age at marriage has not changed much. Compared to this, the change of female age at marriage is large. It was 25.3 in 1987 and 26.8 in 2002. However, it might appropriately be said that even this range of delaying is not so consequential regarding the fertility issue[5].

The seemingly small change of marriage timing is partly because of the social capital effect. As Becker puts it, people cannot be perfectly rational in regard to choice of marriage timing or number of kids they have. For instance, extremely late marriages or having no kids is likely to earn socially negative sanctions. People would marry at certain age period when most other people around them think appropriate, even if marriage itself could bring them no profit at that age. However, the effect of socially recognized norms might be different according to the environment one lives in. Therefore, it is reasonable to take the effect as a variable in a statistical model. The social capital effect is hard to measure, but for the issue here, it can be represented by the area of living, namely whether the subject lives in an urban area where people might have more liberal attitudes toward norms, or in a rural area where the surrounding people might be more conservative.

3　Data and Variables

Data sets used here to check the validity of the models presented in the previous section is NFRJ98 and JGSS (2002)[6]. NFRJ98 (National Family Research in Japan, 1998) is the random sampling national survey conducted from 1998-1999 including 6985 cases. The sample population subjects were 28 years old or older Japanese, living in Japan. JGSS (2002) is another national survey, which was conducted in 2002 with 2953 cases. The sample subjects were 20 years old or older. I will use both of these studies, selecting each data set according to the requirements for theoretical models. Subjects used in the analysis of this paper are all 40 years or younger.

Variables used in this paper are outlined below.

Educational career: Both data contain variables related to the educational background. In this paper, we focus only on subjects that have a high-school degree or higher. Therefore the education variable contains three categories, namely "high-school" "junior college" and "4-year college".

Income: Both surveys have a series of questions on the subjects' income. This data is provided with a form that has uneven intervals. For instance, NFRJ98 gives the income variable with "equal to and greater than 0 and less than 100," "equal to or greater than 100 and less than 130," "equal to and greater than 130 and less than 200" … and the like. Therefore this variable is recoded to values that

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5 ）These figures are the published data in the longitudinal survey called "shussei-doukou-kihon-chosa (Basic Survey on Fertility)" operated by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

6 ）These data sets were provided by SSJ archive at Japan Social Research Information Center in Institute of Social Science (Tokyo University).

are in the middle of each interval[7]. This transformation might bring a bias, but this step is used mainly for easiness of interpretation.

Occupation: JGSS (2002) utilizes the occupation classification of SSM95 formalities[8] that has more than 180 categories. This minor classification is reshaped here to the major division, namely "specialist" "manager" "clerk" "sales" "skilled worker" "semi-skilled worker" "unskilled worker" "farmer, forest worker, fisherman." This major classification is again reduced to "specialist" "manager" "clerk" "sales" "worker" here, excluding the last category and put together three "worker" categories, mainly for simplification. Occupational prestige scores are assigned according to the results of SSM95 survey. NFRJ98 has a type of job variable that has the same kind of major classification, but does not include a minor classification.

Family support: This is represented by whether a subject lives/has lived with parents when they are/were single; whether they are/were parasite singles or not. Though it is possible that a subject does more housework and has to contribute money to his or her parents, this possibility has to be simply dismissed, mainly because of lack of data indicating gain and loss of living with parents. In addition, it can be thought that being a parasite has an economic disadvantage when compared to non-parasite.

Another problem is that each survey does not give us the information that can be used to determine whether subjects lived with or apart from their parents before marriage. NFRJ98 survey asked samples whether they have experienced living apart from their parents, but it does not certify whether they lived with or apart from parents just before marriage. In this paper, however, subjects with experience of living alone before marriage are counted as parasite singles or previous parasites. Lastly, the family support factor may be broadly categorized as a type of social capital, but I treat this as an independent factor here.

Social capital: As already mentioned, social capital is hard to represent with measurable data[9]. I am going to use a variable indicating the living area of subjects, which has four categories: "metropolitan areas", "cities with 100,000 people populations or above", "cities with less than 100,000 people populations" and "rural areas" for NFRJ98 data and three categories: "13 largest cities", "other cities" and "counties" for JGSS (2002) data. This variable is used also as a control variable for the analysis of the other variables, as well as it is assumed to represent a difference in social norms for the living areas of the subjects. In this paper, it mainly performs the role of a control variable, for the factor of social norm is not the focus of attention.

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7) In the case of NFRJ98, income score is recoded from ordinal scale (0, 0–100, 100–130, 130–200, 200–400, 400–600, 600–800, 800–1000, 1000–1200, 1200 or more) to interval scale (0, 50, 115, 165, 300, 500, 700, 900, 1100, 1300). In case of JGSS(2002), from ordinal scale (no income, 1–70, 70–100, 100–130, 130–150, 150–250, 250–350, 350–450, 450–550, 550–650, 650–750, 750–850, 850–1000, 1000–1200, 1200–1400, 1400–1600, 1600–1850, 1850–2300, greater than 2300) to interval scale (figures are omitted to save space.)

8) SSM (Social Stratification and Social Mobility) is one of the major social survey in Japan. SSM occupation classification is a variant of Japanese Standard Occupational Classification made by Statistical Bureau at Management and Coordination Agency in Japanese government.

9) For sociologist version of the measurement method, see Lin (2001).

4 Preliminary Description of Overall Trends

Since this paper puts the primary focuses on the life course selections of Japanese young adults after graduation from subjects' final educational institution before marriage, the first choice is their jobs. The relationship between one's educational career and initial job type after graduation is shown in table 1.

Table 1: Initial job type and educational background

	Female			Male		
initial job type	high	junior college	college	high	junior college	college
specialist	5.2	10.9	5.7	1.9	2.2	10.2
clerk	23.7	15.8	7.6	7.4	2.2	14.4
sales	13.6	3.5	2.2	11.2	0	5.1
worker	7.9	2.6	0.8	28.6	5.8	0.6

Source: JGSS (2002).

From this table which indicates cell-frequencies that amount to 100 for each sex, the major life courses of females who at least graduated from high-school are; from high-school to clerical work (23.7%), service job (13.7%), worker-class job (7.9%), from junior college to clerical work (15.8%), specialist work(10.9%), and from 4-year college to clerical job (7.6%). To confirm the effect of educational backgrounds on the selection of initial jobs, the results of multinominal logit models are presented for each gender (see table 2). Even after controlling the age and living area variables, some of the effects of education seems to have statistical significance[10], especially for males.

However, even though some dummy variables have significant effects, the factor of education on the whole seems not so strong and clear. The coefficients of determination are not so high and some dummies are not statistically significant[11].

Table 3 shows the results of the OLS standardized regression models. Response variable is income. Explanatory variables are; present type of job and educational career, transformed to dummy variables. Oddly enough from the human capital perspective, for both male and female models, the effect of an educational career does not show statistically significant results[12].

The fact that the income of the young does not defer much according to the type of job and educational background implies that income for most of the young might not be enough for them to live by themselves. In fact, most of them live with their parents. Each cell in table 4 shows the number

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10) Category of "worker'' is the comparison group here. Here, we regard age and living area as control variables. Several dummy variables are used here. Within dummies for age level, the 30s is the baseline category. As for dummies of living area, "living in 13 largest cities'' is the baseline.

11) This might be in part by the small sample number, but that does not explain well the smallness of $R2$. $R2$ for female model is 0.08, and one for male is 0.13.

12) For table of male, jobtype does not have siginificant effects ether. This is partly because, however, high school graduate worker has longer length of service.

Table 2: Multilogit result: factors of initial job type

variables	Female		Male	
	Coefficient	p-value	Coefficient	p-value
		Equation1: specialist		
Age-group				
20–24	baseline			
25–29	0.67	0.34	−0.89	0.15
30–34	0.57	0.36	−0.58	0.33
35–39	−0.49	0.41	−0.53	0.37
Area				
13 largest cities	baseline			
other cities	0.08	0.90	−0.82	0.09
counties	−0.87	0.26	−0.34	0.56
Education				
high-school	baseline			
junior college	1.80	0.00	1.73	0.01
college	2.08	0.00	3.44	0.00
constant	−0.30	0.72	−1.65	0.01
		Equation2: clerical		
Age-group				
20–24	baseline			
25–29	0.79	0.23	−0.47	0.35
30–34	0.59	0.30	−0.17	0.72
35–39	0.15	0.78	−0.32	0.52
Area				
13 largest cities	baseline			
other cities	−0.97	0.09	−0.48	0.25
counties	−1.19	0.07	−0.92	0.09
Education				
high-school	baseline			
junior college	0.69	0.11	0.42	0.41
college	0.92	0.16	2.33	0.00
constant	1.65	0.02	−0.61	0.24
		Equation3: sales		
Age-group				
20–24	baseline			
25–29	−0.02	0.98	−0.17	0.74
30–34	−0.57	0.35	0.05	0.91
35–39	−1.18	0.04	0.00	1.00
Area				
13 largest cities	baseline			
other cities	−1.16	0.06	−0.91	0.03
counties	−1.63	0.02	−1.00	0.05
Education				
high-school	baseline			
junior college	−0.37	0.46	−35.25	1.00
college	−0.04	0.96	1.36	0.00
constant	2.27	0.00	−0.13	0.80

Source: JGSS (2002)

Table 3: OLS regression results on factors of income

Variables	Female		Male	
	Coefficient	p-value	Coefficient	p-value
job type				
specialist	baseline			
clerk	−1.78	0.957	−10.159	0.855
sales	−86.149	0.08	−39.176	0.49
worker	−102.885	0.042	−57.989	0.288
education				
high-school	baseline			
junior college	18.673	0.576	−9.363	0.869
college	32.755	0.337	−8.106	0.837
constant	243.481	<0.001	346.061	<0.001

Source: JGSS (2002)

Table 4: Frequencies of parasite single

Job type	high	junicol	coll
specialist	10	20	24
	6	11	8
clerical	30	23	43
	23	18	29
sales	20	6	22
	13	5	14
worker	43	11	15
	31	8	12

Source: JGSS (2002)

of parasite singles on the bottom of each cell and total number on the upper. Without specialists with college degrees, more than half of the single women are parasite-singles. This number is smaller when the subjects are male, but nonetheless it is extremely difficult for young Japanese to live apart from their parents, mostly due to low salaries for younger workers.

This is thought of as a result of the "joint offense" of two structural traits in Japan; namely, the seniority wage system on the side of working organizations and the custom of generous parental support to children on the private side. Japanese family sociologist M. Miyamoto does not see this situation as "carefully secured young", but describes it as "social vulnerability of the young" (Miyamoto 2002). This label surely goes with current societal trends where more and more college graduates experience difficulties in planning their secure future life courses. The once predominant phrase "parasite singles" has an implication that young people are enjoying their single life with ample support from parents. But the other half of the fact is the social system of seniority, plus high housing expenditure, that might force the young to have no choice but to live under the wing of their parents.

5 An Event History Analysis of Marriage Timing

In this section, the focus is on the timing of marriage and possible factors included in it. An event history or survival model is used here, to effectively utilize the samples who are not married so far at the survey period[13]. Table 5 shows the estimated results of a Cox regression model, showing the relationship between marriage timing and explanatory variables: gender, educational background, initial type of job after graduation, experience of living apart from parents before marriage, and population size of living area.

Table 5: Cox regression result

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Gender		
Female	1	
Male	0.654**	(0.053)
Age		
per on year	1.008	(0.011)
Education		
high-school	1	
junior college	0.659**	(0.059)
college	0.646**	(0.061)
First job type		
worker	1	
specialist	1.010	(0.119)
clerk	0.913	(0.096)
sales	1.054	(0.115)
Area of living		
metro area	1	
over 100000	1.118	(0.101)
less 100000	1.114	(0.122)
rural area	1.184	(0.125)
Living single before marriage		
no	1	
yes	0.490**	(0.037)
N	1045	
Log-likelihood	$-$5449.884	
$\chi^2_{(11)}$	236.063	

Source: NFRJ98

The effect of population size and initial type of job are not statistically significant in this model. All dummy variables for the types of initial jobs have no statistical significance[14]. Instead, regarding

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13) Cox proportional hazards model is adopted. For the method of event history analysis, see Yamaguchi (1991). The data set used is NFRJ98, which contains information of the subjects' experience of ever living apart from parents. Statistical software used here is Stata (8.2).

14) There is no way to check the effect of income just before marriage. But from analysis from previous section, the effect of income from job is likely to be small. In any case, the detailed analysis of this point can only be done with panel data, which is much harder to obtain.

the controlling of these variables, the effect of education and parasite is clear.

Higher educational career, namely high-school to junior college and to college, makes one's hazard ratio of marriage drop to approximately 65%. This clear-cut relationship between education and marriage timing, however, should not simply be interpreted as the push of income toward marriage. If income itself is the leverage, the non-significance of job type toward the hazard ratio of marriage cannot be well explained. The seniority system, though, could explain this puzzle. Income disparity in Japan is usually said to become more apparent with age, in the way that college graduates are more likely to receive siginificant pay boosts while most high-school grads have to live with a slower raise ratio. But this alone cannot explain the facts about late marriage for those with high education. From the simple opportunity cost model perspective, the costs of marriage would not be so different among all education groups, because of the little wage difference among them. The model of latent opportunity cost might have to be made for understanding this[15].

Next, those with no experience of living apart from their parents before marriage (present or previous parasite singles) increases the hazard ratio of marriage by around 200%. The interpretation of this strong influence is crucial but difficult, however, especially when thinking of the imperfectness of data. There might be subjects who once lived apart from parents but lived again with parents later and got ample family support before marriage (like in the cases of so-called U-turn employment[16]). It is difficult to obtain detailed survey data that include this type of information. However, even though I simply ignored the U-turn employment possibility, it is still reasonable to argue that parasite singles are more likely to marry, taking strong statistical evidence shown in the analyzed model into consideration.

6   Conclusion and Task Ahead

Recently, a considerable amount of discourse about the problems of the life of the young in Japan has been found in the major mass media and publications. One of the problems of the young is of course deferral of marriage. In 2003, another problem labeled as the growing amount of "furi-ta-" became popular, which refers to the young who graduated from school but do not have a full-time job. The word parasite single has played a role in understanding these problems, attributing the problems to a mental disposition of the recent young person who allegedly has a weak sense of independence.

Arguing against this kind of understanding problem are some researchers, focusing on the more economical or social structure. For instance, economist Ota demonstrated that there is a tendency for Japanese young females with difficulties in the recent job market driving them to proceed to higher

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15) Stated simply, college grads are likely to take a career-driven type of job, which means less time to search an appropriate mate, less time to be involved in a relationship, more subjective requirements to marry and have kids, considering extremely high level of educational cost. I could substantiate it with data, but it is skipped in this paper, because of space and because main focus here is the effect of family support.

16) This term refers to the case when graduates leave their first home to be enrolled in a college far from home, but return home after graduation, finding jobs near there.

education, which in turn defers their marriage timing (Ohta 2002). Though he leaves it as a future task to investigate the relationship between higher education and late marriage, the attribution of the problem to the objective environment rather than the subjective mentality of the young seems to indicate the right orientation. This paper suggests the same direction. The working situation for the entire Japanese young is quite severe recently. Even those with the highest education may have difficulty living apart from their parents. The event history analysis shows evidence that those with experience of living apart from parents marry late.

Some tasks are yet to be investigated. I could not have access to useful panel data at the timing of this paper, which means that I had to do a time-series analysis with cross-sectional data sets. Another remaining issue is the close inquiry into the seniority system in Japan, which I assume is a fundamental problem here.

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