
Universal Value Concepts and Paradigms of Culture

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The argument presented in the paper draws on the Platonic theory of forms, specifically those of the true, the good, and the beautiful, considered as primal human values. The concepts are then considered in their historical application as core values in different civilizations. This gives rise to the theory, based on Plato's stress upon the true, that the Western world's preoccupation with scientific and forensic truth is a by-product of this position, with ethics and aesthetic taking up subsidiary roles within the architectonic of values. In contrast, examination of the Confucian tradition of China discloses the structure of a civilization in which moral values expressed in social relations is declared the prime value, with the scientific and the aesthetic being subordinate. To complete the contrast of different and variant relations between the three values, Japanese civilization's stress upon purity and renewal would suggest a civilization in which the beautiful is the prime value, with Confucian-style goodness and Western-style scientific truth being subordinate. The paper concludes with practical observations upon ways in which these differences obstruct mutual understanding, and comments upon how such misunderstanding may be overcome.

Introduction

The objective of this paper is to identify and describe paradigmatic tendencies within configurations of human culture through viewing their roots in and emphasis upon different patterns in the relationship of three common core human values.

One of the key concepts expounded by Plato in the *Republic*, Plato, is that of *eidos*, a concept expressed in English usually as the Forms or the Ideas. In the world of universal value concepts, he recognized the primacy of the true and the good. In his early years, however, he had considered the beautiful to be equal in standing to the others, but in later life, for various reasons, he relegated it to an inferior rank.¹ At any rate, these three concepts became the framework for the subsequent subdivision of philosophical investigation into the three fields of metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, a structure for research, writing and teaching that has functioned throughout the centuries. The last great thinker to employ the framework in a comprehensive and systematic manner was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) whose *Critical Philosophy* began with the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), followed by the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and completed in the *Critique of Judgement* (1790). In these three principal works, he dealt respectively with the problems of the possibility of metaphysics, the foundations of ethics and the nature of aesthetic judgement. Until very recently, university

departments tended to follow this division of the philosophical task, and such classifications are still reflected in the various cataloging systems employed by libraries worldwide.

While all three areas are very important for the completeness of human knowledge and a total grasp of human cultural development, it seems that outwith Kant's attempt to produce an integrated framework at a purely philosophical level, no single civilization has successfully managed to nurture all three values equally through integrating them in a balanced manner. Perhaps we should speak not of these values as universals, in Plato's sense of abstract forms, but rather as tendencies within cultures, universally present, in some form, but in varying proportions or in varying degrees, which give rise to those unique cultural configurations we refer to and classify as "civilizations". It is the contention of this paper, that one possible way of understanding and classifying civilizations might be in accordance with which of the three "universals" is held as the primary value, and how the other two are related to it within the historical development of the culture and its contemporary expressions that have arisen from its historical past. Specifically, and in a test of the hypothesis, I would like to examine three cases to determine which of the three values took precedence, once thought had moved beyond the mythological stage of its development.

Viewed in this way, in the arrangement of its architectonic of core values, Greek, and consequently western civilization came to be based primarily upon a search for the true, with a concomitant belief that absolute truth in some form existed and could be both discovered and defined. Therefore, philosophy and science became primary activities, while in matters of society, the practice of law takes precedence as a search for forensic truth based on the principle of natural justice and natural law.²

In contrast, and in keeping with its original and more spiritual aspiration and inspiration, the Hebrew tradition is as much preoccupied with what is good as with what is true. The long history of Judaism is the primary source of moral values in the western world, Christianity having basically inherited the ethics of Judaism. This is not to say that Judaism did not encourage science. Many great scientists have come from that tradition. However, the pursuit of the ethical was perceived as giving life meaning and value, with concepts such as "doing justly and loving mercy" expressed as modes of being in the processes of life.³

Arguably the greatest paradigmatic civilization that moved from the mythological to the ethical in the development of its thought is the tradition of China, which will be the one of the examples cited for comparison in this argument. In the Confucian architectonic of values, wisdom became subordinate to goodness. There are, of course, fundamental differences between the Judaeo-Christian and the Chinese perception of the role of values lies in life and society, but central to both is a concern with the same form of the idea of the good, and its social ramifications.⁴

The remaining core value is the beautiful. Beauty is of course highly valued in all civilizations for varying reasons. Perhaps in the western hemisphere, Italian high culture, particularly as defined by the Renaissance and its proximity to classical civilization retains the strongest emphasis upon the importance of beauty combined with functionality. Chinese civilization was highly artistic and like the western classical world, indulged lavishly in artistic symbolism. Art, however, was decorative, and not endowed with independent meaning. It was therefore similarly in each context used in a utilitarian manner to express grandeur or glory. While beauty and functionality can be distinguished in a general way in

western civilization, in the culture of Japan, they merge to the extent that art and architecture, ritual and life along with the many other modes of human activity become art forms in their own right. In the Japanese tradition, it could be argued that the beautiful became the primary value to a similar degree that the good is in the Chinese tradition and the true is in the western tradition.

In addition to the question of classifying philosophies of culture, there is one further issue of considerable significance in the ongoing process of interaction between Asia and the west. All human civilizations have been affected by the process of modernization and the concomitant influence of western technology and science. Of the most profound interest is how the two great Asian civilizations of China and Japan have accommodated their traditional value systems to the needs of a modern industrial economy. A more profound understanding of how this process works this would improve the quality of understanding between civilizations, and enhance the dialog between the developing industrial world and the already industrialized world. The woeful inability of many western business and political leaders to understand either Japan or China adequately in this regard, or even seek to recognize fundamental differences lies at the root of the many ignorant comments that are made all too often. This situation might in part be improved by paying greater attention to these fundamental paradigmatic differences and their consequences for the ways of thinking and behaving of the peoples of these civilizations.

The Primacy of Philosophy and Science in the West

The primacy of science and philosophy was never stated more clearly than by the neo-Hegelians of Victorian Britain, last amongst whom was Professor Charles Arthur Campbell.⁵ of the University of Glasgow. His *Philosophical Lecture Notes* (pages 42 and 43), which I read as a student in his class, reflected the wisdom of the day, which powerfully displayed great admiration for the Greeks as the origin of progressive scientific culture. He quoted from R. R. Marret:

To break through custom by the sheer force of reflection, and so to make rational progress possible, was the intellectual feat of one small people; and it is highly doubtful if, without their leadership, a progressive civilisation would have existed today.

This statement was supplemented by the words of Sir Henry Maine:

To one small people ... it was given to create the principle of progress. That people was the Greek. Except the blind forces of Nature, nothing moves in this world that is not Greek in its origin.

The phil-Hellenism of the 19th Century was perhaps a justifiable appreciation of the innovativeness and genius of Greek culture, but it is very much a one-sided story that is still being debated to the present in the form of the moral ambiguity often expressed by critics as inherent in scientific and technological revolutions. The same science that gave us medical miracles also presented us with the atomic bomb.

Traditionally, it meant, first and foremost, the exaltation of Aristotelian metaphysics and a preoccupation with the conceptualizing of the world in terms of substance. After the Reformation, it came to imply the primacy of empirical and theoretical science as the means

of defining the nature of reality. Just how deeply embedded is the concept within all western cultural systems is fairly obvious even at a cursory glance. Firstly, consider the primacy of scientific truth as evidenced by institutions such as the Nobel Prize for science. The scientific has in some instances become almost sacred. One side effect has been the penchant for the quantification and assessment of quality according to calculi (particularly in the culture of United States) is another expression of the search for the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Science again developed for these purposes. Out of this has come modern reliance upon economic theory and statistical data and the claim that economics too can be a “science”, all be it still a hotly contested issue. In the realm of the social order, the primacy of forensic truth in matters of law may be enlisted in order to give such proceedings the proper air of scientific authenticity. This, I would consider to be one of the better adaptations of the scientific.

On the debit side, and very much part of the scientism that mesmerized the early 20th Century, was the tradition of the Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism as it expanded and elaborated upon the basic insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein as stated in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. This movement carried the idea of the primacy of science to its logical end. “The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said *i.e.* the propositions of natural science.”⁶ The English language version of the movement was expressed in A. J. Ayer’s *Language, Truth and Logic*, which argued that the meaning of a word was no more than the method of its verification, a concept which really bore no close scrutiny. How can the meaning of a word be a method? No examples were ever given. It did, however, demonstrate that the hegemony of science belonged truly only to the realm of the scientific, and could not serve as a model for other areas of life. The position, however, is far from dead, and appears from time to time in strange new guises.

One form of the appeal to the scientific, however, that is extremely difficult to comprehend, is the strange idea of ethical truth, meaning that there is and must be a right or correct world order that can be defended and justified, even militarily if necessary. The medieval crusades organized by the papacy and the modern crusades by the moral right, for example, against freedom of choice in the United States is veiled in an aura of sanctity in such a way that its arrogant dogmatism seems “morally” justifiable. By confusing spiritual beliefs with scientific truths, it is but a small extension to speak of ‘moral truths’. If examined more carefully, the idea of moral truth is not the pursuit of good either socially or personally. It is rather the attempted imposition of believed propositions as though they were scientific or self-evident truths, such as human equality. The moral truth allegedly enshrined in the principle of the sanctity of life is simply a persuasive definition of the commandment “Thou shalt not kill”, invoked as a case of special pleading, but whose inherent self-contradictory nature is shown in the instances of right to life followers mercilessly murdering physicians who held views on the subject that differed from their own. At its worst, rhetoric about moral truth can be enlisted, in effect, to hijack one longstanding western moral rule and direct it towards morally dubious uses. While this has little to do with the scientific directly, it illustrates the power of the words “scientific” and “truth” in the western imagination, however much they may be abused in the process. Apart from noting the abuse of the term scientific by Marx⁷ and the former communist system in Europe, there is perhaps little more needed to substantiate the case being made.

The Primacy of the Good in the Confucian Tradition

Confucian thought runs through Chinese civilization like a vein of gold in a large mass of rock. The role of the tradition functions as a vision of how things should be in an ideal world. It reaches the present in the form of statements by philosophers and sages, pronouncements by emperors, and in the folk songs and conversations of teachers, dealing specifically with the ideas of order and hierarchy. The relation between the good and the true, in the Chinese architectonic is best set forth in the words of Confucius about the good man and the wise man.

“The wise man delights in water. The good man delights in mountains. The wise are active, the good are tranquil. The wise enjoy. The good endure” (*Analects* VI, 21). While wisdom may be respected, goodness is to be revered because it endures.⁸ One of the finest subsequent elaborations of the Confucian vision comes from Mencius, (II, i, vi, 507), who declared that “The four foundations (of the moral cosmic order) are, *ren* (仁), *yi* (義), *li* (禮), and *zhi* (智). If these four foundations can be established throughout the society, they will be sufficient to create and preserve world order.” *Ren* means humanity. *Yi* is commitment of the common good, equating almost to an ideal of justice. *Li* is respect for social and religious order and *zhi* means wisdom arising from sound education. These core values stand at the peak of the hierarchy.⁹ Confucius said of his own ideas that if they were to prevail, it would be *Ming*, and if they were to fall, it would also be *Ming* (命), which may be translated roughly as “destiny” of “fate” written usually in the form *Tian Ming* (天命), the Decree of Heaven, understood as an impersonal but purposeful force that regulated the world order. People should follow the path they believe to be correct, whether they succeed or fail. To act in such a manner is to “know *Ming*”. People who do not know *Ming* cannot be superior people in the Confucian sense.

A further key to how the order functions is contained in the idea of *Cheng Ming* (名命)¹⁰ meaning literally, to name things correctly, referring to both objects and titles. It is another aspect of Confucian idealism, that a ruler be a ruler and a subject be a subject. Where people do not conform properly to their name, there will be disorder.

“If you do not name things correctly, you cannot communicate accurately about them with language.... If ritual and music do not develop properly, the law will not punish the guilty or protect the innocent.” (*Analects* XIII, 3)¹¹ The implication is of the importance of the maintenance of the moral order.

We may close this brief discussion with three observations about the nature of the good in Confucian thought. Firstly, it is fundamentally a form of idealism, similar to Plato’s theory in that people should conform to the ideal of the station in life appointed to them.¹² However, in contrast, there is also a deontological element¹³ in the requirement that people should pursue the path of duty irrespective of outcome. Finally, overall, it should be clear that the Confucian approach to the good is through the pursuit of virtues. That is to say that the good is also to be viewed in Aristotelian terms as a quality of wellbeing to be realized in society through virtuous action. This in turn is reflected in the quality of human institutions and in the moral order that should pervade all human activity.

The Primacy of the Beautiful in the Japanese Tradition

While much of Japan's material culture came from China, one of the generic value concepts belonging uniquely to Japanese culture itself is the primary emphasis placed upon purity. The generic ritual of Shinto is *misogi shuhō* (みそぎ手法), purification in a river, under a waterfall or in the sea.¹⁴ In Japanese mythology, the creative *kami* (divine being) Izanagi-no-mikoto, after leaving the land of impurity where he saw the decomposing form of his wife, purified himself by washing in the Tachibana River, an act referred to ritually in most major Shinto *norito*. The utility and the ideal of purification run through the entire culture of Japan, manifested in countless forms expressed in daily living.¹⁵

Purity is essentially an aesthetic concept, and is a pre-condition for the existence of beauty. Thus beauty itself becomes a great virtue, one that we can see at all stages of the development of the culture, past and present. Indeed, the seminal idea of purity is absolutely fundamental to all Japanese ethics and aesthetics. It is the point at which they meet and merge.

The presentation of food, the packaging of gifts and the penchant for appearance over function is well known, such as the white seat covers in taxis that are changed daily. In the West, art is framed and hung on a wall. In the tradition of Japan, it is co-extensive with life. The tea house and the garden are a visual and physical continuum. Politeness, formality and ritual are as important as an agenda. Appearance, in such a cultural context, becomes more important than reality, form being more important than substance. The periodic reconstruction of Shinto shrines to keep them new and bright, such as the *Ise Jingu no Shikinen Sengu*, the 61st taking place in 1993, preserves form at the cost of substance and is the basic illustration.

Nakamura Hajime, Japan's foremost intellectual historian has offered numerous suggestions about the cultural tendencies in Japan that illustrate precisely the deeper roots of these assorted points and observations:¹⁶

... we should notice that the Japanese are willing to accept the phenomenal world as Absolute because of their disposition to lay a greater emphasis upon sensible intuitive events, rather than upon universals.

Hence the various forms of attention devoted to the purity and beauty of the world as it is perceived.

While much Confucian culture had been absorbed from China, the Japanese refinement of it was very much along aesthetic lines. Scholars of the 18th century *Kokugaku* (National Learning)¹⁷ movement sought the pure forms of the classical Japanese aesthetic. They found it in many sources, primarily in the poetry of the *Man'yōshū*¹⁸, a collection of several thousand short poems composed by Emperors, courtiers and other individuals in the earliest period of recorded history and which expressed the pure and simple ideas of the Japanese of antiquity. It was essentially an investigation into two different styles of beauty, the one formal and stylized, name the Chinese, and the other, natural and emotional, namely the Japanese. The Chinese exaggerated, elaborate and excessive. The Japanese was simple, unadorned, natural and understated. The Japanese aesthetic thus came to be defined primarily in terms of Japan's unique characteristics, *kunigara*,¹⁹ beauty of national character, nobility, simplicity, naturalness and beauty.

One further illustrative concept of Japanese aesthetics which shows how close is the aesthetic ideal to life is the idea of *mono no aware*, articulated most powerfully by Motoori

Norinaga.²⁰ The translation of this term has always been difficult, because it literally means “the pity of things”, a form of words that conveys the idea that aesthetic sensibility is of the essence of life:

If I were to express what is heart of the spirit of Yamato (Japan),
It is the sight of the wild cherry blossoms in light of the rising sun.

There is little in Japanese culture where the aesthetic does not take precedence, even death itself, or suicide, has been depicted as a form of the aesthetic. The famous *Shinju Monogatari* of Chikamatsu Monzaemon²¹ have been rendered in present-day theatres in a modern form, displaying the inherent beauty of double suicides of the Edo period (1615–1868). Behind these is the concept of the purifying power of death. Indeed, the seminal idea of purity is absolutely fundamental to all Japanese ethics and aesthetics. Without it, the characteristics of Japanese values can be satisfactorily defined or explained.

Observations on Modernization and Traditional Culture

The processes of modernization in Asia are frequently misunderstood through the application of inappropriate models.²² The western world and its experiences have been the source of the models by which it has been analyzed and discussed, but this is a questionable methodology. For the understanding of modernization in the context of a different architectonic of core values operating, it has to be recognized that different traditions may approach modernization in different ways.

The impact of technology has always been the driving force of historical change, and technology has always preceded science.²³ The Tartars were using stirrups before Newton's laws were defined and steam trains were running before the laws of Thermodynamics were enunciated. Classical Chinese civilization achieved almost every discovery that created the Industrial Revolution in the west,²⁴ but left to later generations the question of why no industrial revolution took place there. The paradigm expounded above may offer one clue as to why Chinese thought focused on a moral order rather than a scientific one.

The profound urge first seen in the classical age of western civilization to seek philosophical and scientific explanations returned strongly at the time of the Renaissance, which in turn led to the revival of Greek science and to many kinds of empirical experiment. It was a natural response of the mind to seek an explanation of the phenomena confronted in nature. The speed with which technology and science forged ahead in the west is evidence of that ancient urge.

The same was not so in China. This does not mean that the Chinese were not interested in science, or that they took a moralistic attitude towards it, as some modern westerns have done. It means rather that the basis of their civilization, as we have seen, was concerned with the ethical in the broadest sense in the Confucian understanding of social good rather than moral goodness. The subjects for study for the civil service examinations, until the collapse of the Ching Dynasty in 1911, were the Confucian classics. Stated another way, the basic agenda of the civilization was preoccupied with issues of conduct and manners, and with the proper performance of the appropriate rituals that would ensure the maintenance of the ‘moral order’.

The Chinese invented gunpowder which they employed in making fireworks. The west used it to make bombs, cannons that projected missiles and eventually as a basis for the study of propulsion and eventually the jet engine. A lot of science was developed between these stages of technology, but this was quite consistent with a system of culture that identified the scientific as the highest of its values.

Similar points may be made about Japan, which did possess a native curiosity about science and technology, but whose basic cultural inclinations were towards the aesthetic in both art and literature. As has been noted, Japan is one of the few places where a prize may be awarded for the most artistic way of writing a single letter. To modernize, Japanese delegations went worldwide in search of successful models to follow, and created, in the process, what has been called a bricolage culture,²⁵ or as I have called it, a multiplex value system in which, in spite of all its hi-tech skills, the aesthetic still plays a predominant role. Beauty and purity are still core values in Japan.

The contrasts here appear to add weight to the argument that the differences in how core values are related go a long way to explaining the tendencies of a cultural system and how it might be predicted to respond to the forces of change as it encounters them internally and externally. Consequently, the modernization of Japan and China should not be interpreted solely along western lines, nor for that matter in terms of each other. The Confucian heritage is part of the Chinese legacy to most of Asia, but each culture has appropriated the tradition in terms of its own perceived needs, with the result that observations about one will seldom be true of another.

Universal Analytical Models and Their Applicability

What thus far does this argument tell us? The western preoccupation with the scientific at the expense of other values may be blinding politicians, diplomats and academics to alternative ways of communicating meaningfully and functioning effectively in the international arena. The primacy of the scientific and the obsession with science has helped to breed the assumption that there must universally valid rules that explain how everything happens, and that the western world is itself a model of this. The work of the Vienna Circle and the Logical Positivist movement seems to be the most extreme form of this self-defeating tradition. But are such assumptions justifiable? Is economics indeed, for example, a science? If it were, why do economists disagree so much and invariably make wrong predictions? The present seems to be about interfacing and about alternative ways of thinking needs which arise from the very limitations of the applicability of western models?

Three concluding propositions seem to me to arise from this discussion if it has any validity whatsoever. Taken together, they might form a code of practice helpful to anyone dealing with value conflicts at any level, whether in business, diplomacy or academia.

- (1) We should acknowledge that there is no hegemony of science except in the province of science.
- (2) In recognizing the place of the ethical in human culture, we should acknowledge that there is much to commend the idea of "common good", the utilitarian ideal that has helped Asia to balance ethics and economics in a Confucian-style doctrine of economic justice, in many ways better than the west. Hutcheson, Mill and the philosophers of relation can perhaps now be appreciated in a different light.
- (3) Most difficult of all is the implication that paradigmatic differences should be respected rather than

“evaluated”. Traditional Asian nations have never tried to impose their values upon other civilizations. China, for example, in spite of much western paranoia, has always been the invaded, rarely the invader. The philosophy of live and let live, with concomitant recognition of and respect for pluralism and diversity in paradigmatic values is perhaps one of the only ways forward to a progressive human civilization in which intolerance and rejection come to be replaced by toleration and communicative openness.

Notes

1. See my comment in Picken, *Shinto: Japan's Spiritual Roots*, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1970, p. 57.
2. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*. Cambridge: University Press, 1928.
3. *Micah* 6: 8 (American RSV, 1881).
4. Julia Ching, *Confucianism and Christianity*. London: Macmillan, 1994, includes discussions of relevant topics.
5. Campbell, Professor C. A., *Philosophical Lecture Notes*. Glasgow: University of Glasgow Publication, 1958 edn., pp. 42–43.
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Paragraph 6.53. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 189.
7. Marx in *Das Capital* makes extensive use of the term “scientific” with regard to the nature of socialism but with no detailed elaboration of his meaning in relation to the use of the term.
8. Confucius in this section makes clear his view of the primacy of goodness over wisdom, or the “scientific”.
9. The Confucian hierarchy of values and relations lies in the background of the discussion, and are implicitly assumed.
10. Also known as the Rectification of Names (See R. Dawson, *Confucius*. Oxford: University Press, 1981, pp. 56–58 (*Cheng Ming*)).
11. The philosophical basis of Confucianism idealism is to be found in these concepts.
12. The 19th Century neo-Hegelian, F. H. Bradley, illustrates this way of thinking in his famous essay “My Station and its Duties,” *Ethical Studies*, Oxford: University Press, 1912, p. 160.
13. This view is derived from the Kantian concept of the Categorical Imperative expressed more recently in the work of W. D. Ross, for example, in his *Foundation of Ethics*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1936.
14. In the mythology recorded in the *Nihon Shoki*, the Japanese kami Izanami-no-mikoto, after visiting Yomi-no-kuni, the netherworld, purifies himself in the river Tachibana. Book I: 14–21, Tokyo: Tuttle Edition, 1972, pp. 21–25.
15. See my *Essentials of Shinto*, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 171–175 on the topic of *oharai*, ritual purification.
16. Nakamura Hajime, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii, East West Center, 1968, p. 350.
17. The *Kokugaku* movement was an attempt by Japanese scholars to identify and define what was pure Japanese tradition as distinct from the overlay of Chinese culture that had accrued since the Heian period. See my *Essentials of Shinto* (op. cit.), Chapter 9, on Shinto Thought.
18. *Man'yōshū* (tr. H. H. Honda, Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1967).
19. *Kunigara* is an aesthetic concept which is almost untranslatable because of its nuances. There are a cluster of concepts in Japanese ending in *-gara* such as *aida-gara*, translated as “human between-ness.” *Kunigara* would thus translate “Country (i.e. Japan)-ness”, as understood, however, by the Japanese. The English term “national character” would be the closest Western rendering.
20. Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801). For a useful general study in English, see Matsumoto Shigeru, *Motoori Norinaga*, Harvard: University Press, 1970.
21. Chikamatsu Monzaemon was an Edo period (1615–1868) dramatist whose love-suicide tales were highly popular and well received by Edo audiences, and which are still frequently re-run in present day Japan, sometimes set to music or otherwise modernized.

22. Eisenstadt, S. N., *Modernization: Growth and Diversity*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963, stressed the convergence of values. James Abbeglen pointed out that Japan does not readily fit western models, a point which Eisenstadt latterly conceded in a lecture given at the International House in Tokyo in 1984.
23. Black, C. E., *The Dynamics of Modernization*, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967, p. 11.
24. Needham, Joseph, *The Development of Science in China*, Cambridge: C.U.P., 1985.
25. La Fleur, William on *bricoleur* culture, see *Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 1.